RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Impairment of Contract-Mortgage Moratoria-[Federal].-

Laws of Minnesota (1933), C.339, Part 1,4, authorizes the district court of the county
to extend the period of redemption from mortgage foreclosure for a "just and equitable" period, not beyond May 1, 1935, contingent upon the mortgagor paying the reasonable rental value to be applied to the interest, taxes, and mortgage indebtedness.
The mortgagor is to retain possession during this extended period, but interest continues on the loan, and the act preserves the mortgagee's right to title or deficiency
judgment if the mortgagor fails to redeem. The petitioner, mortgagor, applied to the
court under the provisions of this act, and, over the objections of the mortgagee-purchaser, was granted an extension of the period of redemption until May i, 1935, conditioned on his paying the reasonable rental value. The Supreme Court of Minnesota
denied the mortgagee's contention that this violated the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution. (Art. i, § io). Held, on appeal, the statute as applied does not violate
the contract clause of the Federal Constitution; the emergency existing in Minnesota
furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the protective power of the state which
is read into all contracts, and the relief afforded is reasonable, protecting the interests
of mortgagees as well as mortgagors. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,
54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934), Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler JJ.,
dissenting.
The present case would seem to be an affirmation of two propositions; first, that the
contract clause is limited by the reserved or police power of the state, and second, that
this reserved power must be reasonably exercised. As such, the decision summarizes
and furthers the gradual assimilation of the contract clause to the fourteenth amendment. See Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudications-A Study of Modified
and Overruled Decisions, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 375 (1933). This gradual assimilation
has been furthered by the upholding of some legislation operating on the enforcement
of a contract claim as affecting the remedy and not the right. Sturges v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat (U.S.) 122, 200, 4 L. Ed. 529 (r819);Jacksonv. Lamphire,3 Peters (U.S.) 280,
287, 7 L. Ed. 679 (1830); Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U.S. 595, 23 Sup. Ct. 345, 47 L. Ed.
609 (1903); Funkhouserv. Preston, 54 Sup. Ct. 134, 78 L. Ed. 125 (1933); cf. Curtis v.
Whitney, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 68, 71, 2o L. Ed. 513 (1871); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S.
595, 600, 24 L. Ed. 793 (1877); Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U.S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 44,
62 L. Ed. 178 (1917); James v. Stull, 9 Barb. (N.Y.) 482 (185o); March v. State, 44
Tex. 64 (1875). And by the recognition that contracts concerned with matters inherently affected with a public interest may be abrogated by legislation for the public
welfare. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 24 L. Ed. 1O36 (1879) (nuisance);
Stone v. 31ississippi, IOI U.S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079 (188o) (lotteries); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623,8 Sup. Ct. 273,31 L. Ed. 205 (1887) (liquor control). Later cases expanded the concept of "affected with a public interest" to include matters temporarily so
affected. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865 (1921); Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170,41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed. 877 (1921); Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595 (1922); Wickersham,
The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws, 69 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 301
(1921). Whether these contracts be deemed to have been "frustrated" or "appropriated," to use the language of the dissenting opinion in the principal case, 54 Sup. Ct.
231, 253-54, they were subject to a police power reasonably used for a legitimate end.
See 47 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1034).
Debtor relief legislation, however, might well have been excluded from this dis-
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pensation given other statutes inasmuch as the historic purpose of the contract clause
was to prohibit "laws delaying the collection of matured debts," i Beard, The Rise of
American Civilization (1927), 328; Edwardsv. Kear-ey, 96 U.S. 595, 604-607, 2 4 L. Ed.
793 (1877). Thus various forms of stay laws enacted during recurring depressions have
been held unconstitutional as impairing existing contracts. McCracken v. Hayward,
2 How. (U.S.) 6o8, ii L. Ed. 397 (1844) (prohibiting a foreclosure sale for less than
two thirds the appraised value of the property); Bronson v. Kinzie, i How. (U.S.) 311,
ii L. Ed. 143 (1843) (unconditionally extending the period of redemption for one year
without provision for payment of rental value); State v. Klein, 249 N.W. 118 (N.D.
1933) (extending all periods of redemption for a year with no compensation provided);
see Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria, i Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 249 (1933); Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46
Harv. L. Rev. io6i, io8i (1933). The present case now places this class of legislation
under the protection and the restrictions of the police power. See Corwin, Moratorium
over Minnesota, 82 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 312 (1934).
The dissent of the minority in the present case, however, would indicate their belief that the use of the reserved power'of the state is based on the doctrine of implied
conditions, contingent upon an interpretation of the possible intent of the parties.
Thus they conclude that although there may be an implied condition that a business
affected with a public interest may be prohibited, it "would be more than unreasonable, it would be absurd" to imply a condition that performance of the obligation in
the same business may be modified since it must be assumed "that the contract was
made on the footing that so long as the obligation remained lawful, the impairment
clause would effectively preclude a law altering or nullifying it however exigent the
occasion might be." 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 254.
Undoubtedly there is some similarity between the police power and the doctrine of
implied conditions. It has been suggested that the real basis for the police power is
justice between the parties, Abbot, Police Power and Right to Compensation, 3 Harv.
L. Rev. 189, igg (i8go), and the actual basis for implied conditions is said to be fairness between the parties, 2 Williston, The Law of Contracts (1920), 1577, § 825. An
implied condition, however, may be negatived by the expressed intention of the parties. 2 Williston, The Law of Contracts (1920), 1575-1576, § 824. There is no such
limitation upon the police power. See Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557,
562, 19 Sup. Ct. 281, 43 L. Ed. 552 (1899). Thus in the present case, if the mortgage
had contained an express declaration that the obligation should not be modified during
any emergency, an implied condition would have been impossible, yet the court undoubtedly would have held the contract subject to the reserved power. of the state.
And while the parties might be considered to be contracting away future rights which
might be given to them by any stay law, such provisions undoubtedly would be disregarded as are similar attempts to evade the bankruptcy laws. Nelson v. Stewart, 54
Ala. 15, 25 Am. Rep. 66o (1875); FederalNational Bank. v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157,
148 N.E. 379 (1925); 40 A.L.R. 1443 (1925).
It is clear, however, that legislation which alters existing contracts must be reasonable if it is to be upheld. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 774, 775, 2 Sup. Ct. 91
27 L. Ed. 468 (1882). In the present case, the emergency and the protection afforded
the mortgagee's interest seem to have been indispensable to a finding of reasonableness. Whether there is any difference, which may be doubted, between an emergency
creating a power and the emergency furnishing the occasion for the exercise of the pow-
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er (54 Sup. Ct. 231, 235), the emergency is an operative fact without which the statute
would not have been upheld. The payment of a fair rental value, the limitation of the
extension to a definite and comparatively short time, the continuation of interest, and
the preservation of the right to a deficiency judgment are all factors protecting the interest of the mortgagee, and the absence of any one of them might have led the court
to declare the statute unreasonable. Thus the fate of less conservative moratoria legislation is doubtful. Cf. Alliance Trust Co. v. Hall, 5 F. Supp. 285 (D.C. Ida. 1933).
Moreover, should certain moratoria legislation be held unconstitutional as to certain
types of property only, as has been suggested, the question of equal protection of the
laws may arise. Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254

(1921); see Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria,
i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 260, 261 (I934); 17 Harv. L. Rev. 66o, 666 (1924).
If the fate of future legislation modifying existing contracts is to be dependent upon
what the courts will call "reasonable," it is important to know whether the courts will
follow the usual rule in determining the constitutionality of a statute and presume
reasonableness in the absence of a showing of unreasonableness. 2 Willoughby, The
Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929), 42. While there is some lan-

guage in the present case which might indicate that reasonableness will be presumed
("Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of policy is a question with
which we are not concerned." 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 243), the mere declaration by the legislature that an emergency exists will not suffice. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. Ed. 841 (1924); but see Wigmore, A Constitutional Way to

Reach the Housing Profiteer, 15 Ill. L. Rev. 359, 365 (1921). The courts may follow
the somewhat analogous treatment of the guarantee of freedom of speech and of press,
and perhaps require a greater showing of constitutionality than is usually the case.
See PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. .Malon,260 U.S. 393,43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922);

Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria, i Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 249, 251 (1934); but see Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775, 2 Sup. Ct.
91, 27 L. Ed. 468 (1882); as to freedom of speech and of press, see Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919); Gitlow v. State of New York,
268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925); Stromberg, v. State of California,
283 U.S. 359, 5i Sup. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 11r7 (93i); Near v. State of Minn. ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 73 L. Ed. 1357 (1930; Walsh, Freedom of Speech
and Press, 21 Geo. L. Jour. i6i, 188 (1033); 14 111. L. Rev. 6o (1920).

In its use of reasonableness as the test, the court avoided saying that the legislation
involved merely the remedy and not the right. As enunciated by Marshall, the doctrine that legislation impairing the remedy and not the right was not an impairment of
contract seems to have been a short hand way of declaring reasonableness. Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122, 200, 4 L. Ed. 529 (I819). Since then, the distinc-

tion has been applied somewhat automatically. See Von Homffan v. City of Quincy,
4 Wall. (U.S.) 535, 554, 18 L. Ed. 403 (1866); 31 Harv. L. Rev. 49T (1918). The court

approached the terminology of the remedy-right doctrine, when it pointed out that
courts of equity have fixed the time and terms of sale of mortgaged property and have
refused upon equitable grounds to confirm sales, and that the statute in question provides a cognate procedure and relief. See Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556, 85
A.L.R. x477 (Wis. 1933); 8 Minn. L. Rev. 318, 327 (1934); 42 Yale L. Jour. 961 (933).
When applying the remedy-right doctrine courts have reasoned from the practice of a
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court to the ability of the legislature. This was recently done by the Supreme Court in
Funkhouser v. Preston, 54 Sup. Ct. 134, 78 L. Ed. 125 (1933). But an erroneous decision
of a court ig not an impairment of contract, nor, it would seem, a denial of due process.
Central Land Co. v. Laidley 159 U.S. 103, 112, 16 Sup. Ct. 8o, 40 L. Ed. 91 (1895);
Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U.S. 86, 29 Sup. Ct. 483, 53 L. Ed. 709 (19o8); Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29,44 Sup. Ct. 246, 68 L. Ed. 547 (1924); Black, American Constitutional
Law (4th ed. 1927) 628, 71o; but see 28 Ill. L. Rev. 832 (1934). And what is permitted

the court is not necessarily permitted the legislature.
The Supreme Court disregarded the suggestion of the Minnesota Court that the
act in question could possibly be maintained as an exercise of the power of eminent domain. Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Association, 249 N.W. 334, 338 (Minn.
1933); see Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 692, 17 Sup. Ct.
718, 41 L. Ed. 1165 (1897). The lack of condemnation proceedings or of action taken

under an eminent domain statute would not change the essential character of the eminent domain power. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 54 Sup. Ct. 26, 78 L. Ed. 37
(1933). A private individual acting for his own benefit may be given the power to exercise eminent domain for the state. i Lewis, Eminent Domain ( 3 d ed.

19o9),

15,500,

§§ 6,253. Because of the emergency, it would be a public use that mortgagors be left in
possession and be given additional rights to regain title. See Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S.
361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676,49 L. Ed. 1o85 (1905); Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200
U.S. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 58i (19o6); cf. New State Ice Co. v. Lielnnan, 285
U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (193i); Connecticut College for Women v.

Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88 Ati. 633 (I913); Palairet'sAppeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep.
450 (1871); 15 Harv. L. Rev. 900 (1902); 23 Yale L. Jour. 274 (1914). It would seem
doubtful, however, whether the fair rental value, while a factor makingfor reasonableness under the police power, is fair compensation under eminent domain. Cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463
(1893); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 43 Sup. Ct. 354,
67 L. Ed. 664 (1923); Olson v. United States, 67 F. (2d) 24 (C.C.A. 8th 1933). While

the inability of the mortgagee to take possession may not be so important inasmuch as
the land is desired as security in most cases (The Supreme Court pointed out that most
of the mortgagees were corporations. 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 243), the mortgagee is still denied clear title, and the right to make improvements at depression prices. Admitting
that the right of immediate sale in a depressed market might not be of much value, the
extension of the period of redemption leaves the mortgagee in the position of knowing
that if economic conditions improve he will probably never get the land, but if values
decrease, he will get the land when it is worth least.
The significance of the present case is perhaps to be found in the declaration by the
Chief Justice that "there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the
necessity of finding rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare."
54 Sup. Ct. 231, 241. This growing appreciation of public needs was expressed in somewhat similar language by Justice Cardozo in Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process
(1921), 82. To find this rational compromise will involve not only legal reason and
acumen, but "the highest attributes of statesmanship." Brown and Hall, The Police
Power and Economic Reconstruction, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 224, 248 (1933); Gray, The
Nature and Sources of the Law (1909), 215.
ROBERT B. Smkpmo

